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Global	Aphasia	and	the	Language	of	Thought1	
(Afasia	global	y	el	lenguaje	del	pensamiento)			
Abstract:	Jerry	Fodor's	arguments	for	a	language	of	thought	(LOT)	are	largely	theoretical.		Is	there	any	empirical	evidence	that	supports	the	existence	of	LOT?		There	is.	Research	on	Global	Aphasia	supports	the	existence	of	LOT.	In	this	paper,	I	discuss	this	evidence	and	why	it	supports	Fodor's	theory	that	there	is	a	language	of	thought.		
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Resumen:	Los	argumentos	de	Fodor	a	favor	de	un	lenguaje	del	pensamiento	(LOT)	son	en	gran	
parte	teóricos.	¿Hay	alguna	evidencia	empírica	que	apoye	la	existencia	de	LOT?	La	investigación	
sobre	afasia	global	apoya	la	existencia	de	LOT.	En	este	artículo,	discuto	esta	evidencia	y	por	qué	
apoya	la	teoría	de	Fodor	de	que	hay	un	lenguaje	del	pensamiento.	
	
Palabras	clave:	Jerry	Fodor,	Rosemary	Varley,	lenguaje	del	pensamiento,	afasia	global,	teoría	de	
la	mente,	gramática	artificial,	símbolos	Bliss,	disociación	de	sistemas		
Bio:		Fred	Adams	is	Professor	of	Linguistics	&	Cognitive	Science	and	he	is	Professor	of	Philosophy	at	University	of	Delaware,	USA.		He	has	over	150	publications	in	philosophy	and	cognitive	science.		
Affiliation:		Professor	of	Linguistics	&	Cognitive	Science.		Professor	of	Philosophy.	University	of	Delaware,	Newark,	Delaware,	19716	USA.	Email:	fa@udel.edu																																																													1	I	am	extremely	grateful	to	Rosemary	Varley	for	generously	answering	many	e-mailed	questions	about	her	work.	During	my	research	on	this	topic	I	have	been	helped	by	the	following	undergraduate	students	interested	in	undergraduate	research	at	the	University	of	Delaware:	Saumya	Sharan,	Robyn	Lachow,	Jared	Delffer,	and	Nate	Fulham.	Versions	of	this	paper	were	presented	at	the	Atiner	Conference	in	Athens	in	May	of	2018	and	at	the	Morris	Colloquium	on	the	Self	and	its	Realizations,	UC-Boulder,	June	16-18.	I	am	grateful	to	the	participants	for	feedback	and	to	two	anonymous	referees	for	excellent	suggestions	and	help	revising.		
	
1. Introduction	In	a	series	of	important	works	(Fodor,	1975,	1987,	2008),	Jerry	Fodor	argued	for	the	existence	of	a	brain	code,	a	mentalese,	a	language	of	thought	(which	has	come	to	be	known	as	LOT).		Fodor	mounted	persuasive	reasons	why	LOT	is	not	a	natural	language.	These	include	but	are	not	limited	to	the	following:		(1)	There	are	nonverbal	organisms	that	think;	(2)	There	are	preverbal	children	that	think;	(3)	Language	learning	requires	hypothesis	formation	(i.e.,	thinking);	(4)	One	cannot	learn	a	language	unless	you	already	know	one—which	is	innate	(to	avoid	regress).		 An	additional	part	of	the	basis	for	this	hypothesis	is	the	fact	that	thought	is	structured.	So	support	came	from	the	parallel	between	the	structure	of	spoken	and	written	languages	and	the	structure	of	thought	itself.		Spoken	and	written	languages	have	a	compositional	structure	to	both	their	syntax	and	semantics.		There	is	a	productivity	that	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	rules	for	construction.		Similarly,	thought	itself	seems	to	mirror	the	same	structure	and	to	be	explainable	by	the	same	computational	principles.2		 Part	of	the	basis	for	this	hypothesis	is	provided	by	the	kind	of	mental	processes	that	are	required	for	language	learning.		Fodor	puts	it	this	way:	…perceptual	processing	(perception	of	any	kind	but	especially	of	language)	presupposes	a	representational	system	rich	enough	to	distinguish	between	sets	of	physical	properties	of	sentence	types,	and	being	able	to	distinguish,	phonological,	acoustic,	morphological,	and	syntactic	properties	of	sentence	tokens.	(Fodor,	1975,	51)																																																									2	Of	course,	Fodor's	general	argument	for	the	Representational	Theory	of	Mind	(RTM)	also	formed	much	of	the	basis	for	his	defense	of	LOT.	Not	to	be	overlooked	was	the	ability	of	LOT	and	RTM	to	solve	"Frege's	Puzzle"	(Fodor,	2008).	On	this	last	point,	see	also	(Adams	&	Fuller,	1992,	and	Adams,	Fuller,	&	Stecker,	1993).	
	Hence,	much	of	the	basis	of	the	argument	for	thought	having	a	language-like	structure	was	an	
inference	to	the	best	explanation	style	of	reasoning.		That	is:	learning	a	language	requires	a	set	of	mental	operations	that	allow	the	above	kinds	of	linguistic	processing.		What	is	the	best	explanation	of	the	nature	of	thought	that	would	explain	the	above	list	of	thought’s	properties?	It	is	that	it	involves	language-like	units	with	compositional	syntax	and	semantics,	viz.	an	innate	language	of	thought	or	LOT.		That	is,	there	must	be	a	medium	for	the	computational	processes	of	language	learning.		Hence,	a	list	of	the	kinds	of	properties	of	thought	that	a	compositional	LOT	would	help	explain	include,	but	is	not	limited	to	the	following:	(1) Productivity	(in	principle	infinite	competence)(Fodor,	1987);	(2) Systematicity	(if	one	can	believe	aRb,	then	one	can	believe	bRa)	(Fodor,	1987);	(3)	Recursivity	(thoughts	have	a	repeatable,	nestable,	compositional	structure)	(Fodor,	1975,	1987);	(4)	Ability	to	represent	both	actual	and	non-actual	states	of	affairs	(Fodor,	1975,	1987).	So	we	can	arrive	at	the	conclusion	via	abductive	reasoning	for	LOT	with	Fodor's	own	words:	We	are	back	to	our	old	point	that	psychological	processes	are	typically	computational	and	computation	presupposes	a	medium	for	representing	the	structures	over	which	the	computational	operations	are	defined.	(Fodor,	1975,	51)		 	
2. Additional	empirical	support	for	LOT	While	Fodor	(1975)	included	some	evidence	from	psycholinguistics,	most	philosophers	and	linguists	recognize	his	arguments	for	LOT	as	theoretical	arguments.		Indeed,	not	being	an	experimentalist	by	nature,	it	is	hard	to	know	what	else	Fodor	might	have	appealed	to	in	coming	up	with,	articulating,	and	defending	his	arguments	for	LOT.		However,	not	long	ago	I	was	
introduced	to	the	work	of	Rosemary	Varley	and	her	colleagues	at	University	College	London.		They	have	had	an	ongoing	research	project	studying	subjects	with	what	is	know	as	Global	Aphasia.		Varley	and	her	colleagues	have	come	to	believe	that	there	are	two	systems	in	the	brain	that	can	dissociate:	the	language	system	and	the	cognitive	system.		Over	the	course	of	many	interesting	experiments,	she	and	her	colleagues	have	accumulated	an	impressive	set	of	data	to	support	that	there	is	this	dissociation	in	these	subjects.		In	the	remainder	of	this	paper	I	will	present	the	findings	of	some	of	her	research	(and	related	research	on	Global	Aphasia).		I	will	examine	the	strength	of	the	defense	of	her	thesis	of	dissociation,	and	I	will	address	the	matter	of	whether	the	work	of	Varley,	her	colleagues,	and	other	researchers	(Glass,	A.V.,	Gazzaninga,	M.,	&	Premack,	D.	1973)	on	global	aphasia	offers	empirical	support	for	the	existence	of	LOT.3		
3. What	is	global	aphasia?	Global	aphasia	is	not	just	one	thing.		It	is	a	family	of	deficits	that	vary	with	the	amount	of	damage	to	language	areas	of	the	brain--damage	that	can	be	caused	by	lesions,	stroke	and	various	other	neural	insults.				 Global	aphasia	is	also	distinct	from	other	aphasias,	such	as	Wernicke's	aphasia	(which	causes	impaired	comprehension	but	not	difficulty	with	word	production,	even	semantically	or	syntactically	garbled	ones).	It	is	also	different	than	Broca's	aphasia	where	comprehension	is	not	impaired	but	subjects	lack	ability	to	produce	language	fluently.		Global	aphasia	acts	like	a																																																									3	Varley	seems	to	me	to	be	quite	philosophically	savvy	and	knowledgeable	about	philosophy.		Still	I	don't	remember	one	place	in	her	research	papers	where	she	mentions	"LOT."		Nonetheless,	I	think	it	is	natural	to	assume	that	she	knows	that	if	she	is	right	in	her	conclusion	about	the	dissociation	of	the	language	system	and	the	cognitive	system,	she	is,	in	effect,	supplying	support	for	the	possibility--indeed	plausibility	of	LOT.	
combination	of	these	other	two	aphasias.		Thus	it	is	a	much	more	severe	form	of	aphasia,	affecting	both	comprehension	and	production.	Symptoms	of	global	aphasia	include	difficulty	comprehending	and	producing	verbs	(Varley	&	Willems,	2010).	Sometimes	symptoms	include	radical	impairment	of	grammatical	and	lexical	capacity.		Subjects	typically	have	difficulty	with	word	comprehension	and	word	finding.	Broca’s	aphasia	is	characterized	by	simplified	syntactic	structures	in	speech	and	writing	and	parallel	difficulties	in	deriving	semantic/thematic	information	from	sentence	structures.		Subjects	with	global	aphasia	typically	have	difficulty	making	grammatical	judgments	about	sentences	and	production	(they	may	simply	stringing	together	a	sequence	of	nouns,	rather	than	produce	subject-predicate	form)	(Varley	&	Siegal,	2000).		As	an	example,	each	of	three	men	with	global	aphasia	(SA,	SO	and	PR)	was	unable	to	understand	the	difference	between	sentences	such	as	‘The	man	chased	the	dog/The	dog	chased	the	man’	(Varley	2014).	The	subjects	are	at	chance	attempting	to	match	sentences	with	pictures	depicting	the	related	actions.	Causes	of	aphasia	include	stroke,	lesions	to	neural	areas	of	the	language	system	of	the	brain	such	as	Broca's	area	and	Wernicke's.		There	is	often	damage	in	prefrontal	cortical	language	areas	and	superior	temporal	gyrus	and	the	tissues	between	those	regions.	Patients	typically	have	lesions	within	left	hemisphere	perisylvian	cortex	and	associated	subcortical	structures	such	as	the	thalamus	(Varley,	2014).	Subjects	with	global	aphasia	often	have	an	impairment	of	peripheral	performance	mechanisms	involved	in	language,	such	as	auditory	perception	(Zimmerer	&	Varley,	2010).	So	damage	to	language-mediating	regions	of	the	cortex	and	associated	sub-cortical	structures	result	in	little	or	no	ability	to	understand	or	construct	sentences	in	any	modality	of	
language	use	(spoken	or	written).		In	addition	to	loss	of	grammatical	ability	there	can	also	be	substantial	impairment	of	lexical	knowledge.	The	mechanisms	involved	in	relaying	linguistic	information	to	form	a	central	competence	are	impaired	in	global	aphasia	(Siegal	&	Varley,	2006).		
4. Agrammaticism	Varley	refers	to	the	linguistic	deficits	associated	with	global	aphasia	as	"agrammaticism."		Here	is	an	example	of	how	she	uses	this	term	as	applied	to	one	subject	S.	A.	In	summary,	S.A.	displayed	a	severe	grammatical	impairment	across	input	and	output	processing	modalities	in	sentence	parsing	(grammaticality	judgments)	and	in	sentence	and	verb	comprehension.	The	term	‘agrammatism’	is	used	to	refer	to	a	spectrum	of	grammatical	disorders,	and	the	complete	loss	of	grammatical	ability	is	very	rare.	Individuals	described	as	agrammatic	normally	have	residual	primitive	grammatical	capacity	that	enables	them	to	understand	and	construct	simple	language	propositions	that	would	enable	some	grammatical	support	of	thinking.	In	contrast,	S.A.’s	impairment	was	profound.	He	showed	no	evidence	of	an	ability	to	formulate	propositions	in	speech	or	writing.	He	was	not	able	to	make	judgments	as	to	whether	a	sentence	is	grammatical,	or	to	match	sentences	to	pictures,	or	to	identify	the	meaning	of	verbs	(Varley	&	Siegal,	2000,	724).		The	deficits	termed	"agrammaticism"	are	severe.	The	patients	described	as	agrammatic	are	unique	in	that	they	perform	at	chance	on	comprehensions	of	canonical	active	sentences	of	the	type	the	boy	kissed	the	girl/	the	girl	kissed	the	boy	(Varley,	2014).		Global	aphasia	profiles	include	lack	of	sensitivity	to	word	order	information,	and	therefore,	incorrect	performance	on	active	sentences	(Varley,	2014).		Such	subjects	cannot	understand	cases	where	meaning	cannot	be	extracted	solely	from	the	semantic	content	of	the	words	alone	(Zimmerer,	Cowell,	&	Varley	2010).	For	such	subjects	production	is	more	greatly	impaired	compared	to	comprehension		(for	example,	subject	PR	had	low	production	scores	but	higher	lexical	comprehension	scores)		(Zimmerer,	Cowell,	&	Varley	2010).	
	
5. Subjects	with	agrammaticism	have	no	significant	cognitive	deficit		Based	in	part	upon	a	study	with	subject	SA	(a	retired	police	officer	who	has	severe	damage	to	left	temporal	language	areas),	Varley	claims	that	agrammaticism	does	not	hinder	cognitive	capacity.		Varley	and	Siegal	(2000)	gave	SA	a	battery	of	tests	for	grammatical	competence.		SA's	performance	on	these	tests	were	barely	above	chance.		On	this	basis	they	claim	he	satisfies	their	criterion	for	being	"agrammatical."4		 Then	they	tested	SA	on	two	other	cognitive	tasks.		The	first	was	causal	reasoning	and	the	second	was	theory	of	mind	(ToM)	tasks.	Varley-	describes	the	causal	reasoning	task:		Causal	reasoning	test	S.A.	was	presented	with	a	picture	card	that	depicted	an	event	on	the	left-hand	side	(for	example,	a	car	crashed	into	a	tree).	On	the	right-hand	side	there	were	three	pictures	(the	target,	for	example	an	alcoholic	drink,	and	two	semantic	associates,	for	example	a	helicopter	and	an	axe).	S.A.	pointed	to	indicate	the	likely	cause	of	the	event.	In	three	training	trials,	the	cue	‘Why?’	was	printed	on	the	card	and	the	task	explained	to	the	participant.	On	the	15	test	items,	no	further	instructions	were	given.	(Varley	&	Segal,	2000,	726)			SA	scored	in	the	84th	percentile	of	correct	responses	for	Wechsler	Adult	Intelligence	Scale	(WAIS)	picture	arrangement	tests.		In	this	test:			 The	standard	WAIS	procedure	was	used.	A	series	of	line	drawings	were	placed	in	front	of	the	participant,	who	was	asked	to	re-arrange	the	cards	so	that	these	told	a	sensible	story	(for	example,	a	simple	item	involves	three	pictures	displaying	the	stages	in	constructing	a	house).	Responses	were	timed	and	scored	for	accuracy	and	speed.		(Varley	&	Segal,	2000,	726)																																																									4	The	method	of	determining	that	the	subject	is	at	"chance"	level	is	as	follows:	a	reversible	sentence	comprehension.	Participant	points	at	a	picture	that	represents	the	interaction	of	two	protagonists.	The	distractor	picture	shows	the	same	protagonists	in	reverse	agent	-	action	-	patient	roles.	There	is	both	an	auditory	sentence-picture	match,	and	written	sentence-picture	match.	Included are	equal	numbers	of	sentences	in	active	and	passive	voice,	to	rule	out	the	strategy	of assuming	the	first	noun	is	always	the	agent.	Hence,	in	cases	where	there	is	a	picture	of	a	man	killing	a	lion	and	one	of	a	lion	killing	a	man,	subjects	are	at	chance	matching	“the	man	killed	the	lion”	to	the	right	picture. 
		 They	also	tested	SA	on	theory	of	mind	(ToM)	reasoning.		SA	was	shown	a	container	containing	unexpected	items.		For	example,	a	pillbox	containing	buttons.		He	was	then	asked	what	another	subject	would	"think"	is	in	the	container.		Or	he	was	asked	what	"really"	was	in	the	container.		On	the	theory	of	mind	tasks,	although	SA	had	some	difficulty,	he	scored	well	above	chance.		 Based	upon	these	results	Varley	&	Siegal	(2000)	draw	the	very	strong	conclusion	that	grammatical	competence	and	cognitive	competence	can	dissociate.		Varley	doesn't	claim	that	cognition	and	grammatical	ability	completely	dissociate	(life	long),	but	that	in	an	adult	mind	with	significant	insult	to	the	language	areas,	these	two	competencies	can	come	apart.		They	claim:	 Therefore,	the	pattern	of	responses	revealed	in	this	case	of	severe	agrammatic	aphasia	attests	to	a	dissociation	between	grammar	and	cognition	and	to	the	modular	nature	of	mature	brain	functioning.	Grammar	may	play	a	vital	role	in	configuring	cognitive	processes,	but	once	these	processes	have	been	established,	cognition	can	operate	without	grammar.	(Varley	&	Siegel,	2000,	726)		This	would	be	a	very	strong	conclusion	to	draw	based	upon	one	subject,	but	as	we	shall	see,	she	has	access	to	several	other	subjects	and	other	tests	and	data	that	she	calls	upon	to	support	this	strong	claim.	Varley,	Siegel,	&	Want	(2001)	examined	another	subject	MR	with	global	aphasia	and	with	what	they've	defined	as	agrammaticism.	The	damage	to	MR's	brain	resulted	from	a	left	cerebrial	vascular	accident	with	damage	to	lenticular	striate	cortex,	basal	ganlia	and	internal	capsule	and	internal	cortical	damage	to	the	perisylvian	area.		This	resulted	in	grammatical	deficits.		He	was	at	chance	differentiating	sentences	such	"The	man	killed	the	lion"	vs.	"the	lion	
killed	the	man."		MR's	speech	consisted	of	fragments	of	stereotypic	forms	and	little	ability	to	construct	novel	language	propositions. Theory	of	Mind	(ToM):	since	this	topic	comes	up	several	times	below,	I	briefly	introduce	the	topic	here.5	The	label	"theory	of	mind"	(ToM)	in	the	cognitive	sciences	has	come	to	refer	to	the	general	capacity	to	attribute	mental	states	to	self	and	others	(Goldman,	2012).		This	is	the	kind	of	capacity	thought	to	be	absent	in	individuals	with	autism	(Baron-Cohen,	1995).		It	is	also	a	capacity	associated	with	the	false-belief	paradigm		(Baron-Cohen,	Leslie,	&	Frith,	1985),	wherein	observers	are	able	to	attribute	false	beliefs	to	subjects.	In	a	typical	situation,	a	subject	is	shown	an	object	in	location	A	and	then	the	subject	leaves	the	room.		The	object	is	moved	to	location	B.	Then	observers	are	asked,	"Where	will	the	subject	look	for	the	object	when	re-entering	the	room?"		Will	the	subject	look	at	location	A	(because	he	falsely	believes)	it	is	still	at	location	A?	Or	will	the	subject	believe	it	is	at	location	B	(where	it	has	been	moved).		It	is	said	that	if	the	observer	suggests	that	the	subject	believes	the	object	is	still	at	location	A,	the	observer	has	theory	of	mind.		The	observer	attributes	a	false	belief	to	the	subject.		Curiously,	some	children	prior	to	age	4	will	attribute	to	the	subject	the	belief	that	the	object	is	now	at	location	B	(even	though	not	seeing	the	object	being	moved	to	location	B).		They	attribute	to	the	subject	the	thought	that	the	object	is	"really"	at	location	B,	rather	than	the	thought	that	the	subject	will	mistakenly	"think"	it	is	at	location	A.	
																																																								5	The	explanation	of	how	theory	of	mind	works	splits	into	two	camps,	the	so-called	"theory-theory"	and	the	"simulation"	account.		The	former	actually	attributes	a	theory-like	structure	to	the	subject	who	understands	mental	states	and	how	they	work.		On	the	simulation	account,	subjects	are	said	said	to	use	the	mental	states	to	simulate	the	mental	states	of	another,	without	actually	building	an	internal	theory.		For	more	see	(Adams,	2001).	
	 Despite	his	grammatical	deficits,	MR	is	at	the	64th	percentile	on	causal	reasoning	and	the	WAIS	test.		And	MR	scored	5/5	on	ToM	(theory	of	mind)	tasks	involving	distinguishing	what	a	subject	"thought"	versus	what	was	"really"	the	case.		 On	this	basis	Varley	et.	al.	conclude	that	despite	severe	grammatical	deficit	MR's		linguistic	impairments	do	not	preclude	MR's	ToM	reasoning.		They	take	this	to	show,	as	with	SA,	a	dissociation	between	grammatical	ability	and	cognitive	reasoning	such	as	strong	performance	on	ToM	reasoning.		 To	attain	answers	from	MR	they	described	the	method	used	as	follows:	"The	subject	was	then	asked	the	belief	question	"what	does	the	boy	think	he	has	caught?"	or	a	reality	question	"what	has	the	boy	caught	really?"		Belief	questions	were	prompted	by	a	card	depicting	a	character	with	a	thought	bubble.		And	reality	questions	were	accompanied	by	a	character	beside	a	solid	frame."	Varley		(2014)	describes	in	more	detail	than	in	earlier	papers	how	subjects	were	trained	to	be	able	to	respond	to	ToM	questions.		First,	they	trained	on	the	"think/really"	distinction.		So,	for	example,	SA	was	presented	with	a	bag	of	balls	and	asked	to	guess	how	many	balls	the	bag	contained.		As	he	guessed	a	flash	card	with	a	thought	bubble	with	the	word	"think"	was	displayed.		Later,	he	counted	the	ball	actually	in	the	bag	in	the	presence	of	a	second	flash	card	with	the	word	"really"	showing.		He	then	gave	a	"reality"	answer	about	how	many	balls	were	really	in	the	bag.	That	supposedly	gave	him	an	understanding	of	the	difference	between	"think"	and	"really"	and	a	way	to	express	it	(in	relation	to	the	flash	cards).			 Varley	(2014)	describes	SA's	performance	as	"not	perfect,"	but	that	he	was	able	to	infer	the	knowledge	states	of	others	in	the	ToM	tasks,	even	when	the	beliefs	of	subjects	were	false.		As	in	a	typical	ToM	task,	SA	was	asked	what	a	subject	would	"think"	was	in	a	container	versus	
what	was	"really"	in	the	container.		We	can	assume	the	questions	were	facilitated	by	using	the	flash	cards	upon	which	SA	was	trained.		SA's	performance	was	well	above	chance.		The	conclusion	Varley	et.	al.	wish	to	draw	is	that	SA's	cognitive	ToM	performance	was	not	mediated	by	language	because	of	his	agrammaticism.		 In	another	type	of	experiment,	Willems,	RM.,	Benn,	Y.,	Hagoort,	P.,	Toni,	I.,	&	Varley	RA.		(2011)	& Varley	(2014)	describe	the	performance	of	subject	with	global	aphasia	on	a	communicative	intentions	game.		There	is	a	3x3	grid	with	two	tokens	on	the	grid.		One	token	is	controlled	by	the	sender	and	the	other	by	the	receiver.		The	receiver	has	to	guess	the	intentions	of	the	sender.	The	receiver	does	this	by	observing	the	type	of	token	and	its	placement	on	the	grid	by	the	sender.		Successful	performance	was	the	receiver	interpreting	the	communicative	intentions	behind	the	movement	of	the	sender’s	token,	and	subsequently	positioning	their	token	in	its	correct	location	and	orientation. The	sender	knows	the	final	target	location	for	both	sender's	and	receiver's	tokens	and	has	to	communicate	this	to	the	receiver.		The	sender	has	to	develop	strategies	to	communicate	target	positions	to	the	receiver	and	receiver	has	to	understand	the	communicative	strategies	being	used	by	the	sender.		 The	results	in	successful	communication	for	subject	ST	in	sender	role	was	80%	and	in	receiver	role	79%.	The	desired	conclusion	is	that	the	cognitive	means	by	which	the	subjects	with	global	aphasia	achieved	these	results	were	not	linguistic	due	to	their	agrammaticism.		
6. Some	recursive-style	reasoning	without	language	PR	was	an	English-speaking	62	year	old	man	who	suffered	a	stroke	7	years	earlier.		He	had	a	large	lesion	in	perisylvian	language	area.	He	also	had	damage	to	the	inferior	frontal	gyrus,	
unsula	and	underlying	deep	white	matter.	Superior	temporal,	supramarginal	and	angular	gyri	were	lesioned.	Damage	extended	to	the	inferior	border	of	the	intraparietal	sulcus.	He	could	produce	some	high	frequency	words,	but	his	word	comprehension	was	severely	impaired.	Meaningful	communication	was	only	possible	with	an	abundance	of	hand	gestures,	drawings	and	other	intermediaries.	 	Investigating	the	cognitive	capacities	of	subject	PR,	Varley,	R,	Klessinger,	N.,	Romanowski,	C.	&	Segal,	M	(2005)	discovered	that	PR	could	successfully	compute	mathematical	equations	that	involved	some	recursive-style	cognitive	ability.		For	example,	he	could	solve	50	–	((4	+	7)	x	4)].			 In	a	further	study,	three	subjects	SA,	SO,	PR	also	displayed	the	ability	to	perform	mathematical	calculations	requiring	sensitivity	to	syntactic	nesting	of	operations	despite	being	"agrammatical"	by	Varley's	definition.		These	subjects	were	able	to	correctly	differentiate	the	mathematical	operations	7-2	vs.	2-7	and	20/5	vs.	5/20	and	the	more	complex	embedded	equation	(5	x	(6+2))	(Varley,	2014).		 In	considering	whether	this	ability	was	due	to	some	re-organization	in	the	brain	of	aphasic	subjects,	they	looked	at	fMRI	data	from	these	subjects	and	non-aphasic	subjects	during	calculation.		In	aphasics,	they	saw	no	evidence	of	wide-scale	reorganization.		And	in	non-aphasics	they	saw	evidence	that	some	neural	calculation	is	taking	place	not	in	language	areas	but	in	right	hemisphere	(Benn	et.al.	2012,	2013).	In	addition,	PR	could	also	solve	non-linguistic	theory	of	mind	(ToM)	tasks.		This	finding	is	consistent	with	Varley's	overall	view	that	linguistic	competence	and	cognitive	competence	can	dissociate.		This	would	also	be	consistent	with	the	view	of	Pinker	and	Jackendoff	(2005),	
who	maintain	that	there	is	a	general	recursive	cognitive	capacity	not	dependent	upon	natural	language.		 However,	Varley,	R.,	Klessinger,	N.,	Romanowski,	C.	&	Siegal,	M.	(2005)cannot	draw	the	strong	conclusion	that	PR's	performance	only	supports	the	dissociation	hypothesis.		For	they	acknowledge	that	it	is	possible	that	linguistic	capacity	for	recursion	is	the	"mother	of	recursion,"	and	that	PR's	earlier	linguistic	development	and	linguistic	capacity	was	necessary	for	his	current	cognitive	recursive	capacities.		So	while	PR's	performance	is	consistent	with	the	view	that	cognitive	recursion	and	linguistic	recursion	can	come	apart,	it	is	not	conclusive	evidence	for	that	view.		However,	the	fact	that	fMRI	evidence	reveals	activation	in	non-language	areas	in	non-aphasics	is	at	least	some	additional	evidence	that	language	is	not	the	"mother	of	recursion"	(Varley,	2014).		
7. Failure	to	learn	artificial	grammar	 	It	turns	out	that	PR	is	not	able	to	learn	the	recursive	rules	for	artificial	grammar.	In	one	experiment,	(Zimmerer,	Cowell,	&	Varley	2014)	tried	to	teach	subjects	with	Global	Aphasia	an	artificial	grammar	that	required	grasping	a	kind	of	recursion.		The	rule	was	that	a	string	was	well	formed	if	it	included	A/B	or	a	recursive	function	of	the	same:		A/B,	AA/BB,	AAA/BBB,	and	so	on	(Hauser,	Chomsky	&	Fitch,	2002).		And	while	he	was	above	chance	at	rejecting	some	of	the	ungrammatical	cases	of	the	artificial	grammar,	he	likely	was	using	other,	non-recursive	strategies	in	order	to	do	so.		He	may	have	simply	matched	the	numbers	of	strings	of	As	and	Bs	in	the	artificial	grammar	tree	by	simply	counting.	This	strategy	would	allow	his	answers	to	be	co-extensive	with	the	correct	answers	without	actually	having	learned	the	grammatical	rules	of	the	artificial	grammar. 
	 It	may	seem	surprising	that	subjects	do	poorly	on	the	learning	of	artificial	grammar	if	their	cognitive	system	supports	recursion.		However,	there	are	several	factors	at	play.		First,	the	stimuli	used	were	auditory.	In	several	cases	the	damage	to	the	language	system	also	affected	auditory	systems.		This	may	have	impacted	performance.		Second,	had	stimuli	been	pictorial,	subjects	might	have	done	better.	Instead	of	A/B,	AA/BB,	AAA/BBB,	they	might	have	used	pictures.	In	place	of	'A's	and	'B's	they	might	have	used	pictures	of	dogs	and	cats.	Third,	if	the	subjects	truly	are	attempting	to	treat	the	symbols	as	words	and	their	linguistic	system	frankly	is	"shot,"	then	it	is	not	surprising	at	all	that	they	cannot	plug	the	inputs	into	a	linguistic	system	and	learn	an	artificial	grammar.		Lastly,	as	we	shall	see	below,	other	forms	of	stimuli	do	seem	to	induce	cognitive	capacity	that	should	remain	if	there	is	indeed	a	separate	cognitive	system	of	LOT.		Indeed,	when	they	switched	stimuli	to	visual	shapes	and	colors,	Zimmerer,	Cowell,	and	Varley	(2014)	did	find	some	improvement	in	ability	to	learn	artificial	grammar.		 Furthermore,	the	fact	that	subjects	with	global	aphasia	have	significant	ToM	skills,	suggests	that	these	skills	are	not	based	solely	upon	language.		Of	course,	Varley	et.	al.	similarly	may	wonder	that	since	these	subjects	previously	had	full	linguistic	capacity	,	developmentally	language	may	have	played	a	role	in	their	ToM	skills	after	acquiring	global	aphasia.		That	is,	if	language	were	the	"mother	of	recursion,"	perhaps	it	was	also	the	mother	of	ToM.		The	ToM	skills	of	subjects	with	global	aphasia	may	have	required	linguistic	skills	sometime	in	the	past.		Still,	the	fact	that	pre-linguistic	infants	have	ToM	skills,	does	not	support	the	view	that	language	is	necessary	for	this	cognitive	capacity.				
8. Infant	ToM	There	is	at	least	some	evidence	in	favor	of	the	dissociation	hypothesis	in	data	from	infants	who	apparently	have	some	ToM	skills	at	the	age	of	18	months	(Baillargeon,	R.,	Scott,	R.	&	He,	Z.,	2010).		These	infants	look	longer	when	a	subject	re-enters	a	room	and	looks	for	an	object	where	it	actually	is	rather	than	where	it	was	when	the	subject	left	the	room.		The	argument	made	on	the	basis	of	the	infant	looking	paradigm	is	that	the	infant	expects	the	subject	to	look	where	he	falsely	will	believe	the	object	to	still	be	not	look	where	it	actually	is.		 Since	the	infants	are	pre-verbal,	it	is	not	fully	developed	language	skills	that	explain	their	looking	behavior.		To	the	extent	that	these	experiments	demonstrate	some	ToM	reasoning	among	infants,	that	behavior	cannot	be	explained	by	their	use	of	language.		Of	course,	if	Varley	et.	al.	allow	the	possibility	that	"language	is	the	mother	of	recursion,"	they	may	also	have	to	allow	the	possibility	that	an	innate	universal	grammar	makes	it	possible	for	pre-verbal	infants	to	exercise	some	ToM	reasoning	of	the	sort	displayed	in	the	infant-looking	paradigm.	However,	in	Varley's	favor	is	the	fact	that	unactualized	capacities	are	less	likely	to	explain	actual	looking	behavior.		 Of	course	there	are	other	possible	explanations	of	the	differential	looking	times	of	infants	in	the	ToM	experiments.		They	could	simply	be	doing	some	statistical	modeling	of	human	behavior	without	attributing	the	causes	of	that	behavior	to	hidden	causes	such	as	beliefs.		But	to	the	extent	that	the	infant-looking	paradigm	is	accepted	as	displaying	ToM	reasoning,	then	it	offers	at	least	some	support	for	the	idea	that	they	are	doing	this	without	actualized	language	skills.			
9. What	conclusions	does	Varley	draw	from	her	data?	Based	upon	the	above	discussion	of	results,	we	can	summarize	the	conclusions	Varley	and	colleagues	draw	from	their	studies	of	subjects	with	Global	Aphasia.	First,	subjects	with	Global	Aphasia	have	agrammaticism	(as	operationally	defined	by	Varley).	Second,	despite	their	agrammaticism	experiments	conducted	by	Varley	et.	al.		support	each	of	the	following	claims:		-subjects	with	Global	Aphasia	score	in	normal	ranges	on	causal	reasoning	tasks	and	theory	of	mind	(ToM)	tasks	;	-subjects	with	Global	Aphasia	performed	in	normal	ranges	on	cognitive	tasks	requiring	the	ability	to	play	a	game	of	communicative	intentions	(as	either	an	intention	"sender"	or	"receiver");	-subjects	with	Global	Aphasia	have	recursive	reasoning	ability	(such	as	required	to	solve	mathematical	problems	following	associate	rules	and	nesting	within	equations).		 Finally,	Varley	et.	al.	draw	the	conclusion	that	the	language	system	and	the	cognitive	system	are	"autonomous"	systems—at	least	in	these	subjects	(Varley,	2014).		They	can	function	together	in	normal	adult	humans	who	have	full	language	capacity.		But	they	can	dissociate	in	humans	with	global	aphasia.		All	of	her	studies	are	designed	to	provide	evidence	in	support	of	the	view	that	there	are	two	separate	systems—the	natural	language	system	and	the	cognitive	system.		Her	data	suggests	that	these	two	systems	can	operate	independently	and	do	in	persons	with	global	aphasia.			
10. 	Does	the	data	support	the	conclusions	Varley	et.	al.	draw	from	studies	of	
subjects	with	global	aphasia?	One	Issue	that	needs	to	be	addressed	in	relation	to	Varley's	data	is	the	performance/competence	distinction	and	whether	it	can	explain	why	subjects	that	she	calls	"agrammatical"	still	have	high	cognitive	ability.		The	difference	between	performance	and	competence	in	language	is	that	a	person	may	be	able	to	understand	language	that	the	person	cannot	produce.		For	example,	human	infants	can	often	understand	sentences	that	their	parents	utter,	but	that	the	infants	themselves	cannot	produce	at	that	age.			Another	example	would	be	someone	who	learned	a	second	language,	but	doesn't	use	it	regularly.		This	person	may	be	able	to	understand	someone	who	addresses	them	in	that	second	language,	but	the	person	may	no	longer	be	able	to	respond	in	the	second	language,	because	he/she	didn't	continue	to	actively	use	the	second	language.	When	Varley	and	colleagues	solicit	data	from	subjects	with	global	aphasia,	they	have	to	communicate	with	the	subjects.		Most	answers	they	get	from	them	are	answers	to	questions	in	English.		Whether	it	is	theory	of	mind	questions	(ToM),	mathematical	operation	questions,	or	communicative	intentions	interactions,	the	subjects	have	to	understand	the	questions	or	prompts	that	are	presented	to	them	in	English.		How	are	they	able	to	answer	intelligently	if	they	don't	understand	the	questions?		And	if	they	do	understand	the	questions,	doesn't	that	indicate	a	certain	level	of	linguistic	competence	with	English?		I	posed	this	question	to	Varley	via	personal	communication.			Her	answer	was	that,	in	the	end,	the	subjects	understood	what	they	were	being	asked,	but	to	get	them	to	understand	required	much	non-linguistic	communication.		Sometimes	it	required	gestures.		Sometimes	it	required	drawings	and	other	informal	means	of	communication	to	get	them	to	understand	
what	they	were	being	asked.		I	took	her	response	to	indicate	that	if	the	subjects	genuinely	had	linguistic	competence,	the	experimenters	wouldn't	have	needed	all	the	other	tools	with	which	to	communicate.	A	lingering	worry	is	that	despite	the	extra	effort	and	tools	required,	when	the	subjects	finally	understood	what	they	being	asked,	their	understanding	might	be	in	the	form	of	a	linguistic	representation	of	either	the	question	or	the	task	at	hand.		If	the	subjects	are	using	linguistic	representations	to	understand	the	questions	or	tasks,	however	difficult,	however	many	extra	kinds	of	effort	and	tools	are	involved,	the	experimental	results	would	still	not	show	that	the	subjects	with	global	aphasia	were	using	a	separate	cognitive	system.	At	the	same	time,	in	the	defense	of	Varley	and	here	colleagues,	if	the	subjects	who	are	judged	to	"agrammatical"	even	with	extra	effort,	gestures,	pictures	etc.	still	cannot	distinguish	"the	man	killed	the	lion,"	from	"the	lion	killed	the	man,"	something	serious	is	going	on	at	the	level	of	linguistic	representation.	Given	that	not	being	able	to	distinguish	agent/patient	interchanges	in	language	is	a	center-piece	in	Varley's	operational	definition	of	"agrammatical,"	she	will	count	these	subjects	as	lacking	grammatical	competence.		But	one	may	be	uncertain	whether	this	operational	test	demonstrates	complete	lack	of	linguistic	competence.	By	analogy,	we	wouldn't	say	of	person	with	dyslexia	that	he/she	"couldn't	see."		We'd	say	that	despite	being	able	to	see	their	visual	system	has	a	glitch.		It	visually	reverses	word	order	in	some	cases.		So,	by	analogy,	it	may	be	possible	that	subjects	with	global	aphasia	have	enough	linguistic	competence	to,	with	much	help	and	extra	effort	and	tools,	be	able	to	understand	questions	and	instructions	in	English.		However,	their	linguistic	system	(due	to	neural	insult	in	the	linguistic	areas	of	the	brain),	has	a	glitch	and	they	cannot	accurately	distinguish	agent/patient	pairs	linguistically.	
The	next	worry	is	that	although	Varley	and	colleagues	have	access	to	subjects	with	global	aphasia,	the	actual	number	of	subjects	tested	is	still	quite	small	indeed.		We	understand	the	number	of	subjects	available	is	not	the	same	as	running	experiments	with	undergraduates	at	universities,	where	subjects	are	plentiful.		So	it	is	understandable	why	she	has	a	small	number	of	subjects	(less	than	10).	It	is	true	that	the	evidence	she	obtained	from	her	subjects	tends	to	support	the	hypothesis	that,	while	"agrammatical,"	subjects	had	little	other	cognitive	deficit.		Of	course,	we	don't	know	what	would	be	found	with	a	larger	sample	size.	However,	the	brain	is	a	large	and	complex	organ.		Each	of	her	subjects	had	damage	to	language	areas	of	the	brain	(there	were	insults	to	the	same	general	areas)	but	we	don't	know	exactly	how	similar	the	damage	was	across	subjects.		So	while	they	were	all	"agrammatical"	by	her	tests,	this	might	have	been	for	quite	different	reasons	across	subjects.	So	the	interaction	between	language	and	cognition	could	have	varied	significantly	for	each	subject.		One	just	doesn't	know.	It	is	true	that	it	is	easier	to	find	disconfirming	evidence	than	confirming	with	small	sample	sizes	(and	Varley	and	colleagues	are	testing	for	disconfirming	evidence—disconfirming	that	language	competence	is	necessary	for	all	cognitive	competence).		To	confirm	that	all	ravens	are	black,	one	must	look	at	a	lot	of	ravens.	But	to	disconfirm,	one	need	find	only	one	white	raven.		Varley	and	colleagues	were	looking	for	white	ravens,	and	that	helps	with	the	matter	of	small	sample	size.	Since	there	is	a	small	sample	size,	it	will	be	important	whether	other	researchers	studying	subjects	with	aphasia	are	finding	similar	or	dissimilar	results.		
11. 	Support	from	other	researchers	Glass,	Gazzaniga,	&	Premack,	1973	found	supporting	data	that	is	consistent	with	the	research	of	Varley,	et.	al.	They	tested	subjects	with	global	aphasia	on	ability	to	learn	artificial	languages	and	discovered:	Despite	gross	deficits	in	natural	language,	these	patients	were	able	to	learn	an	artificial	language	system	using	cut-out	paper	symbols	for	words….	and	despite	massive	language	loss	globally	aphasic	patients	retain	a	rich	conceptual	system	and	at	least	some	capacity	for	symbolization	and	primitive	linguistic	functions.	(Glass,	Gazzaniga,	&	Premack,	1973,	95)		They	note	that	right	hemisphere	has	semantic	knowledge,	but	no	syntactic	knowledge.		How	do	they	know	this?		By	studying	split-brain	subjects.		In	fact,	Gazzaniga	became	very	well	known	for	his	work	in	this	area.	They	note	that	damage	to	language	areas	may	leave	pre-linguistic	cognitive	areas	“intact.”		So	they	wanted	to	investigate	the	capacity	for	symbolization	in	patients	with	global	aphasia.	Their	goal	was	to	see	if	subjects	could	learn	an	artificial	language	system	that	Premack	formerly	used	to	study	primates.	They	had	access	to	seven	patients,	all	right-handed,	all	with	global	aphasia.		They	had	severe	language	deficit,	no	language	expressive	capacity,	one	or	two	word	limits,	automatisms,	phonemic	jargon	in	specific	situations,	and	could	not	spontaneously	write	or	copy	written	words.		Subjects	had	limited	linguistic	comprehension—and	what	little	they	did	have	was	erratic	and	unreliable.	They	possessed	limited	recognition	for	three	letter	high	frequency	words.	Six	subjects	age	59-84	were	otherwise	motivated,	bright,	and	eager	to	participate	in	the	experiment	and	training.		All	were	at	least	3	months	post	stroke.	All	were	given	a	pre-test	on	60	word/non-word	pairs.	Two	patients	could	not	do	this	and	their	data	was	excluded.	Of	the	four	
who	remained:	two	made	two	errors	on	the	pre-test.		So,	at	best,	they	could	identify	these	three-letter,	high	frequency	single	words.	Included	in	the	pre-test,	there	was	a	“picture	association	test”	matching	pictures	with	words	and	the	average	correct	response	was	at	54	%.	After	initial	trials,	on	subsequent	trials	the	patients	were	only	at	59%	recognition	for	words.	So	their	language	skills	were	compromised	by	the	damage	to	their	language	areas.	Some	could	distinguish	words	from	non-sense	syllables	(but	didn’t	know	what	words	meant).		This	led	to	speculation	that	the	subjects	did	this	by	retrieving	a	structural	(picture-like)	template	for	words	(vs.	non-words,	for	which	there	would	be	no	template).		 Furthermore,	subjects	failed	to	distinguish	CVC	(consonant-vowel-consonant)	potential	words	from	CCC	(consonant-consonant-consonant)	nonsense	non-potential	word	pairs.		None	of	the	subjects	could	discriminate	words	by	class:	Noun,	adjective,	verb.		However,	given	cut-out	letters	to	spell	words	for	associated	pictures,	4	were	able	to	spell	words,	2	were	unable	to	spell	words,	2	had	semantic	knowledge	of	words,	but	2	did	not	even	though	they	could	spell	the	words	(using	the	pictorial	cut-outs).		 None	displayed	knowledge	of	"singulars"	vs.	"plural"	nouns.	None	displayed	knowledge	of	agreement	of	nouns	and	verbs.		None	displayed	knowledge	of	“three	word	sentences”—even	with	picture	as	visual	aids.		 Consistent	with	Varley's	"agrammaticism,"	findings	these	subjects	could	not	discriminate	"A	hits	B,"	vs.	"B	hits	A."	What	is	more,	none	could	comprehend	or	produce	simple	sentences.		What	is	more,	I	think	the	findings	of	Glass,	Gazzaniga,	&	Premack	are	consistent	with	there	being	a	lack	of	linguistic	competence	among	these	subjects.	
	 Subjects	were	aware	of	surroundings.	They	understood	appropriate	vs.	inappropriate	uses	of	objects.		They	recognized	pictures,	displayed	appropriate	facial	gestures	for	situations	pictured.		They	were	able	to	correctly	sort	pictures	into	piles:	Animal/plant,	animate/inanimate,	male/female,	edible/non-edible	plant,	child/adult.		So	they	had	basic	concepts	and	could	understand	the	contrary	categories	for	those	concepts.	During	the	training	period,	cut	outs	of	symbols	of	varying	size	and	color	were	used.		These	could	be	arranged	left	to	right	to	make	grammatically	correct	sentences.	Words	were	permanent	visual	symbols.		At	first	the	experimenter	makes	the	words	from	the	cut	outs,	the	subjects	merely	use	them.		Sentences	could	be	as	small	as	one	word.		Each	new	word	is	taught	as	the	only	new	word	added	to	a	prior	string.		The	Format:	A	same	A	A	different	B	Gradually	pictures	are	replaced	with	word	symbols	and	queried.		A?A			A?B		Or	__	same	A?		Or	__	same	B?	The	subjects	seemed	to	catch	on	more	quickly	if	material	was	familiar.	One	subject	was	a	“card	shark”	and	did	better	if	symbols	and	words	were	related	to	playing	cards.	Another	was	a	carpenter	and	did	better	with	objects	and	words	related	to	tools.		Reward	for	success	was	as	simple	as	a	social	signal	of	the	experimenter	being	pleased,	but	sometimes	food	or	candy	was	also	supplied.	Subjects	first	learned	on	samples	that	were	always	correct.	Then	gradually	there	was	a	question	symbol	introduced	“is	A	the	same	as	A?”	Is	“A	different	from	B?”	and	there	were	possibilities	of	errors.		Finally	they	were	given	A/A	or	A/B	and	allowed	to	supply	“same”	or	“different"	themselves.	
They	first	were	trained	on	objects:	a	fork	and	a	spoon.		Then	after	they	got	things	right,	they	were	tested	for	transfer	to	non-test	objects:	pencil,	eraser,	etc.	All	subjects	learned	some	variations	of	the	cases.	The	average	length	of	time	required	to	learn	was	one	month,	but	they	learned	more	quickly	after	first	successes	when	learning	a	new	trial.		And	one	patient	could	still	perform	the	learned	cases	4	months	after	the	initial	learning.	Even	“negation”	was	introduced.		“A	not	same	B.”		Or		“A	not	different	B.”	5	of	the	7	subjects	picked	this	up	and	picked	up	the	“transfer”	test	to	new	non-training	object	pairs.		Lexicons	increased:	they	learned	a	few	nouns,	verbs,	and	persons	names,	learned	by	placing	object1	next	to	object	2	and	placing	the	correct	noun,	verb,	or	name	in	between.	So	they	are	learning	to	cobble	together	strings	of	cut	out	words	and	pictures	(where	the	pictures	were	taking	on	the	cognitive	role	of	symbols)	and	they	are	putting	them	together	in	the	logical	form	of	subject-predicate	sentences.			Since	their	purely	linguistic	capacity	to	do	this	with	language	areas	of	the	brain	had	been	compromised,	they	were	discovering	a	"work-around."	They	could	learn	to	string	together	pictorial	symbols	for	simple	sentences	such	as	“Andrea	stir	water.”	Other	examples	of	symbols	learned	include:	“Andrea,”	“John,”	“Tang,”	“water,”	‘’stir,”	“drink,”	”pour.”	They	became	able	to	produce	and	comprehend	three	word	sentences	at	80%	accuracy.		All	but	2	learned	negation.		All	but	2	learned	names.		All	but1	learned	simple	verbs.	The	experimenters	were	able	to	eliminate	the	possibility	that	this	was	simple	S-R	learning.		Subjects	could	comprehend	and	express	very	simple	declarative	sentences	by	this	method,	and	their	use	of	the	symbols	followed	syntactic	rules.	Words	(syntax)	can	be	stored	separately	from	their	semantic	correlates.	
In	some	cases,	patients	could	make	word/non-word	discriminations	even	when	they	didn’t	know	the	meanings	of	the	words	(semantic	content).		In	some	cases	they	could	discriminate	CVC	words	from	nonsense	words—and	to	do	so	they	must	have	used	orthographic	representations.		So	it	seems	that	words	were	in	part	are	stored	as	visuo-verbal	units.	In	some	cases	they	could	spell	words	for	which	they	had	no	semantic	comprehension	(similar	results	occur	in	split-brain	subjects).		Subjects	may	have	manipulated	the	cut-outs	until	they	matched	a	visuo-verbal	unit.	The	fact	that	patients	often	paid	little	or	no	attention	to	the	pictures	supports	this	view.		 One	patient	spelled	“god”	with	satisfaction	though	the	picture	was	of	a	dog.	The	authors	surmised	that	it	is	possible	that	there	are	cognitive	processes	in	both	hemispheres.		These	patients	succeeded	at	sophisticated	conceptual	sorting.		And	they	don’t	suffer	cognitive	deficit	in	proportion	to	linguistic	deficit.		These	are	just	the	sorts	of	findings	reported	by	Varley	and	colleagues.		 Consistent	with	the	research	of	Glass,	Gazzaniga,	&	Premack	(1973)	is	the	work	of	Garrett	&	Beukelman	(1995).		Garrett	&	Beukelman	(1995)	demonstrated	subjects	with	global	aphasia	can	improve	communication	by	gesturing	to	pre-written	sentences	to	convey	thoughts.	But	this	seems	to	be	clearly	a	case	of	lack	of	linguistic	performance,	but	does	not	close	the	door	on	the	possibility	of	residual	linguistic	competence.		So	their	study	doesn't	conclude	that	there	is	cognition	completely	independent	of	language.	However,	Johannsen-Horbach,	et.al.	(1985)	used	a	set	of	"Blissymbols"	(Bliss,	1965)	to	communicate	with	a	subject	with	global	aphasia.		They	discovered	improved	communication	via	these	symbols	that	are	more	pictorial	and	iconic	than	words	of	a	natural	language.	This	study	demonstrates	different	results	than	that	of	Garrett	&	Beukelman	(1995)	because	the	
communication	is	not	via	competence	with	natural	language	sentences.		Since	the	Blissymbols	are	more	pictorial	and	not	words,	this	may	help	to	support	Varley's	position	that	there	are	two	separate	systems	at	work	(a	language	system	and	a	non-linguistic	cognitive	system).		Blissymbols	are	a	visual	symbol	system	of	pictograms	and	ideograms.		In	total,	they	comprise	several	hundred	basic	symbols,	each	representing	a	concept.	The	symbols	can	be	put	together	and	when	composed	can	generate	new	symbols	that	represent	new	concepts.	Blissymbolics	as	a	language	has	certain	advantages	in	comparison	to	spoken	or	written	language.		Utterances	can	be	produced	by	pointing	or	drawing	and	can	be	perceived	by	visuospatial	analysis	(very	similar	to	the	symbol	system	devised	by	Glass,	Gazzaniga,	&	Premack,	1973).	
		In	a	training	session,	4	globally	aphasic	patients		(U.W.,	K.M.,	B.P.	&	F.L.)	were	treated	conventionally	twice	a	week	for	6	months.		None	of	the	patients	were	considered	demented	or	had	an	IQ	of	lower	than	80.		None	of	the	patients	showed	significant	improvement	of	
expressive	speech	during	conventional	therapy	except	during	the	first	3	months	following	acute	pathology.	
	UW	was	a	41-year-old	housewife	and	mother	with	ischemic	infarction.		She	had	right	hemiplegia	and	right	hemineglect.	She	had	global	aphasia,	and	buccofacial	articulatory	and	ideomotor	apraxia	were	found.		She	was	unable	to	name	objects	and.		UW's	spontaneous	speech	was	extremely	non-fluent	and	contained	automatisms.		UW	could	not	name	objects.		UW	could	comprehend	single	words	and	simple	commands,	but	made	frequent	errors	with	complex	commands. KM	was	a	47-year-old	master	house	painter	with	ischermic	infarction.		KM's	spontaneous	speech	was	also	non-fluent	and	contained	automatisms.		KM	could	name	30	%	of	common	objects	correctly	(one	word	names).		KM	had	almost	no	written	language	or	language	comprehension.	BP	was	55-year-old	tailor	who	suffered	a	complete	left	medial	cerebral	artery	infarction.	Right	hemiparesis	and	global	aphasia	were	found.	BP's	spontaneous	speech	was	non-fluent	and	
contained	automatisms.		BP	could	repeat	one	syllable	words	correctly,	but	did	not	freely	generate	speech.		BP's	written	language	was	massively	disturbed.		BP	understood	single	words	and	simple	commands.	FL	was	a	57-year-old	skilled	laborer	with	ischemic	infarction.		FL	had	right	hemiplegia,	right	sensory	loss,	and	global	aphasia.	FL's	spontaneous	speech	consisted	of	fluent	recurring	utterances.		FL's	attempts	at	naming	and	repetition	tasks	resulted	only	in	recurring	utterances.	FL	had	extremely	poor	written	language	and	language	comprehension.	Their	training	method	with	Blissymbols	was	as	follows:		All	patients	received	individual	“speech”	therapy	using	Blissymbols	at	least	twice	per	week	for	at	least	2	months.		Symbols	were	introduced	verbally	and	by	simultaneous	presentation	of	pictures	or	objects	or	by	pantomime	of	the	therapist.		The	patient’s	symbol	vocabulary	was	controlled	and	restrained	at	the	beginning	of	the	session	such	that	new	symbols	only	were	introduced	after	comprehension	of	originals.	Results	of	training	were	as	follows:		All	patients	acquired	a	Blisssymbol	lexicon.		¾	of	the	patients	could	produce	Blissyntactically	correct	sentences	in	response	to	thematic	pictures	of	questions	in	Blissymbols.		An	unexpected	finding	was	the	easy	articulation	of	the	correct	word	together	with	pointing	to	the	corresponding	symbol	(but	these	were	still	one	word	articulations).		Overall,	the	tendency	to	perseverate	was	milder	with	the	symbols	and	the	patients	could	overcome	their	symbol	perseveration	more	easily	than	their	verbal	perseveration.	Productivity:	The	patients	displayed	capacity	for	productivity	of	thought.		So	while	very	limited,	there	is	productivity	of	thought	which	can	be	accessed	by	giving	the	subjects	symbols	
they	can	picture	or	manipulate	and,	hence,	overcome	their	limited	working	memories	for	holding	symbols	in	mind	long	enough	to	generate	syntactically	correct	Blisssentences.		
12. 	Are	there	other	reasons	to	think	that	there	is	a	dissociation	of	language	and	
cognition?		Yes.	Harriet	Read	(now	Cook)	studied	MR	for	music	cognition	and	found	that	MR	displays	significant	music	cognition.		He	showed	highly	complex	music	reading	abilities,	that	is,	not	only	the	ability	to	read	musical	notation	out	of	context,	but	to	read	in	the	context	of	a	score,	follow	individual	parts,	and	recognise	and	interpret	specific	aspects	of	the	score.	MR	showed	a	high	level	of	precision	in	following	music	as	demonstrated	by	page	turning	at	appropriate	points.	And	as	noted	above,	errors	on	score	reading	tasks	were	close	to	target.			 Although	MR	had	difficulty	with	word	reading,	and	profoundly	impaired	performance	on	comprehending	written	sentences,	he	demonstrated	no	difficulty	with	recognition	of	musical	notation	including	fairly	complex	scores.	This	is	particularly	interesting	because	as	symbolic	systems	music	and	language	are	organised	in	very	similar	ways.	Both	are	highly	structured,	'grammatical'	rule	governed	systems.		
13. 	Contrarians	Of	course,	not	all	researchers	find	the	exact	same	results.	Baldo,	et.	al.	(2005),	do	find	that	cognitive	performance	is	diminished	with	diminished	language	capacity	(from	either	neural	damage	or	diminished	capacity	due	to	shadowing).	What	is	more,	they	attribute	some	of	the	cognitive	efficacy	of	language	in	cognition	to	something	like	"inner	speech."	Their	suggestion	is	that	language	facilitates	the	manipulation	of	the	concepts	necessary	for	solving	cognitive	tasks.	
At	the	same	time	they	do	admit	that	there	are	a	number	of	cognitive	domains,	such	as	visuospatial	tasks,	that	appear	to	be	"unaffected	by	language	impairment"	(Baldo,	et.al.,	2005,	249).		Hence,	their	findings	are	certainly	consistent	with	the	last	two	sets	of	findings	above.			At	the	time	of	their	work,	Johannsen-Horbach,	et.al.	(1985)	seemed	to	think	that	subjects	were	mapping	Blissymbols	onto	stored	linguistic	representations.		And	for	one	patient	who	had	almost	no	linguistic	competence,	the	use	of	Blissymbols	did	not	improve	his	communicative	capacity	at	all.		So,	if	the	Blissymbols	are	only	helping	subjects	who	still	have	some	linguistic	abilities,	then	this	study	does	not	demonstrate	two	independent	systems	(one	linguistic	and	one	cognitive	but	non-linguistic).	Nevertheless,	the	symbols	used	by	Glass,	Gazzaniga	&	Premack	and	Blissymbols	are	pictorial.	They	are	clearly	not	words.	They	are	used	in	conjunction	with	words,	true.	But	if	they	are	filling	slots	in	LOT,	it	might	certainly	appear	that	they	are	"mapping	onto	linguistic	abilities."		It	is	not	clear	from	their	work	whether	Johannsen-Horbach	et.	al.	even	knew	of	the	idea	of	LOT,	in	order	to	consider	it	when	interpreting	their	results.		Since	their	subjects	were	using	Blissymbols	in	combination	with	the	few	words	they	retained,	it	also	is	not	surprising	that	the	one	subject	who	had	lost	all	language	would	not	be	able	to	cobble	together	words	and	pictorial	symbols	in	order	to	communicate.		What	is	more,	prior	to	the	training	with	Blissymbols,	none	of	the	four	subjects	were	able	to	communicate	thoughts	linguistically,	nor	to	understand	sentences.	After	training	they	were	able	to	compose		word/symbol	combinations	into	syntactically	correct	strings.		This	is	just	what	LOT	predicts	would	be	possible	if	the	pictograms	are	filling	slots	in	the	language	of	thought.			
	
14. 	Conclusion	If	Fodor	were	right	and	there	were	a	language	of	thought,	and	if	one's	language	and	cognitive	capacities	were	to	dissociate,	one	would	expect	it	to	still	be	possible	for	a	thinker's	cognitive	capacities	to	include	productivity,	systematicity,	recursivity,	and	the	ability	to	think	about	actual	and	non-actual	states	of	affairs.		In	the	research	of	Varley,	et.	al.,	Glass,	Gazzaniga,	&	Premack	(1973)	and	Johannsen-Horbach	et.	al.	(1985),	we	find	just	such	capacities	among	subjects	with	global	aphasia.		Their	linguistic	capacities	suffer	enormously.	They	are	as	Varley	says	"agrammatical."	And	yet	their	cognitive	capacities	differ	little	from	those	had	by	you	or	I.		This	includes,	as	demonstrated	through	the	research	described	above,	each	of	the	four	capacities	Fodor	described.		Subjects	who	learned	to	use	artificial	symbols	systems	developed	modest	productivity.		Also	bear	in	mind	that	many	of	these	subjects	can	drive	a	car,	balance	their	checkbooks,	and	do	other	types	of	activities	that	require	a	normal	productivity	of	thought,	despite	severe	agrammaticism.		 Varley's	subjects	in	the	"communication	game,"	learned	to	either	convey	intentions	to	receivers,	or	to	receive	intentions	from	the	senders.	This	is	clearly	a	form	of	systematicity	of	thought.		 Varley's	(2014)	subjects	displayed	recursivity	in	mathematical	reasoning	ability.		And	MR's	musical	ability	also	displayed	some	of	the	same	kind	of	cognitive	ability.		 What	is	more,	those	who	learned	to	use	Premack's	or	Bliss's	symbols	would	be	able	to	put	together	sentences	about	things	present	or	past,	future	or	false	(if	they	wanted	to).	Taken	as	a	whole	the	research	of	Varley	and	her	collaborators	(and	that	of	the	other	researchers	described	here)	offers	significant	evidence	of	a	dissociation	between	language	
competence	and	cognitive	competence.		Subjects	with	global	aphasia	have	the	latter	but	lack	the	former.	Therefore,	this	research	offers	significant	support	for	the	view	that	there	is	a	language	like	representational	system	in	the	brain	that	is	not	a	natural	language,	but	more	likely	a	language	of	thought.		
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